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Causality and Creation in Cbasidic Kabbalism
Owen Goldin

A

n important strain of medieval Jewish thought, kabbala,
finds its most explicit and rationalistic exposition within
the Chasidic philosophical tradition. A key work is the
Tanya of R. Schneur Zalman of Liadi ("the Alter Rebbe,"
1745-1812) the founder of the Lubavitch or Chabad movement.
Kabbalistic interpretation, speculation, and practice had been
traditionally understood to be too dangerous for all but those who
had reached the highest levels of spiritual and intellectual
achievement. For R. Schneur Zalman, on the other hand, all people
share the intellectual faculties by which the metaphysical structure
of the cosmos can to some extent be grasped. A straightforward,
philosophical exposition of these teachings could allow all who
s
study it to undertand
as much as they are able, which, he thought,
could only be to the good. 1
The second book of the Tanya, Shaar HaYichud
VehaEmunah (/'he Gate to [the Understanding of} G-d 's Unity and
the Faith) deals with the relation between the existence of God and
that of other things, most importantly, that of human beings. R.
Schneur Zalman argues that, if God is the truly first cause, He must
be self-sufficit:nt, which in turn means that He lacks nothing

1

0n the historical circumstances of R. Schneur Zalman's
strategy of communicating hitherto concealed teachings, and the
opposition it encountered, see N. Loewenthal, Communicating the
Infinite: The Emergence ofthe Habad School (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1990), pp. 29-98.
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required for the exercise of His causal power. Monism is the
logical consequence,2 for if there were anything other than God, in
regard to which He exercises His power, such exercise would
depend on this external thing, and for this reason God would no
longer be self-sufficient and all-powerful. 3 Nonetheless, there
appears to be a multiplicity of objects; this multiplicity is consigned to how things seem to us, in a manner that is reminiscent of
the Parmenidean distinction between being and doxa (appearance).
Given that this multiplicity is, in reality (that is, from the
perspective of God) merely the one God, God is responsible for
every detail within the phenomenal world.4 This is not to say that
the regularities that the phenomenal world exhibits have no ground
at all other than their divine origin. R. Schneur Zalman dovetails
an essentialist account of things within his occasionalistic monistic

2

The view that R. Schneur Zalman takes things other than
God to be illusions is argued by R. Elior, The Paradoxical Ascent
to God: The Kabbalistic Theosophy ofHabad Hasidism, tr. J. M.
Green (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993), pp.
49- 57; see also R. Foxbrunner, Habad: The Chasidism of R
Schneur Zalman ofLyady(Northvale, N.J.: J. Aronson, 1992), pp.
110- 11. N. Gurary, Chasidism: It Development, Theology. and
Practice(Northvale, NJ.: J. Aronson, 1997),pp. 120-21, 134-37,
points to the importance of creation to argue that R. Schneur
Zalman' s meaning is not that the world is an illusion. Rather, he
argues, his teaching is merely that the world is contingent. He does
not explain why an illusion cannot be something of importance
arising through the divine will.
3

4

Tanya 1.20-22.

See Tanya 2.7. This view derives from the Ba'al Shem
Tov, the founder of Chasidism. See Gurary, 139- 142, who
compares this teaching to that of Maimonides.
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metaphysics.5 The regularities within the world can be rendered
intelligible by showing how as a matter of logical necessity they
are entailed by these essences. But the existence of a thing with a
certain essence, and the set of the essences that there are, are
contingent, at every moment brought about through an act ofdivine
causation. (The essences ofthings are understood as resultant from
the combination and arrangement of the letters that make up their
Hebrew names.)
R. Schneur Zalman acknowledges that the existence ofthe
world cannot be really explained; the nature of divine causality is
far beyond the grasp of the human mind. Nonetheless, he presents
an account of it, by developing the metaphors of light and speech.
The positive account developed within the Tanya can be
best understood ·in contrast to the classical notions of causality that
would have been familiar to R. Schneur Zalman through his
extensive reading in medieval Jewish philosophy.
What sort of causal link between one event and another is
it that we can immediately understand? Consider what occurs when
someone, call him Michael, hands a letter to someone else, call him
Sam. What is the cause of Sam's having the letter? Clearly it is the
fact that Michael handed over the letter. This event explains Sam's
possession of the letter, and renders this fact intelligible. There is
a necessary link between being given a letter and possessing a
5

Thus in Tanya 2.2, accidental change (yesh miyesh) is
distinguished from the coming into existence of a new substance
(yesh me 'ayin). See the exposition ofY. Wineberg in Lessons in
Tanya, vol. 3 (Brooklyn: Kehot, 1989), pp. 846-47. As in
Aristotelian physics, these two varieties of change are distinguished depending on whether there is persistence of an essential
attribute. But for R. Schneur Zalman substantial and accidental
change, as Aristotle understands them, would both fall under the
class ofyesh miyesh,, for even substantial generation involves the
actualization of a potentiality inherent within already existing
matter. So even here some substrate with some essential attribute
persists through the change.
.
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letter. Consider another case: fire warms the metal which is placed
near it. On a naive understanding of heat and physical objects, here
too something is being given over from one thing to another. The
heat of the fire is transmitted, as it were, to the metal. A third case
is that of the sun, and its light. The sun radiates its light, which
allows it to be seen, in such a way that it allows other things to be
seen. In all of these cases, the fact that B is C is explained by
showing how this is necessitated6 by the fact that C is given to B
by A.7

6

Ifthe effect does not necessarily result from the cause, the

whole cause has not been identified, and the effect has not been
thoroughly explained. One could still ask why the effect that did
not have to come about did in fact occur. These considerations lie
behind the great appeal of a foundationalist account of scientific
explanation, like that of Aristotle' s Posterior Analytics and its
descendants. Insofar as one rejects the view that explanations rest
on principles or facts that do not demand explanation, what one
accepts as an explanation will depart from the ideal of rendering
the world intelligible.
7

The accounts of heat and light that are given by contemporary science·greatly complicate our understanding ofthe true
sequence of events involved in such cases. At the atomic level, the
transfers ofenergy involved are astonishingly complex, and again,
atthe subatomic level, there are apparently gaps between cause and
effect, so that it is not immediately evident why a certain cause
must result in a certain effect. This is because, according to recent
theories in physics, neither heat nor light tum out to be a kind of
stuff or thing, handed over from one place to another. (Indeed, on
one interpretation, the theory of general relativity calls into question the extent to which we are ultimately justified in considering
Michael, Sam, and the letter as substantial realities.) But I bring up
heat and light only as examples. If there really were cases in which
one thing is handed over from one place to another, we would have
a case of an intelligible, necessary causal connection.

Causality and Creation

63

Such explanations rely on what A. C. Lloyd has called
''The Transmission Model of Causality," pervasive in Western
philosophical thought.8 Its most comprehensive and systematic use
was in the natural philosophy of Aristotle, to which R. Schneur
Zalman would have been exposed, in his reading of Maimonides.
Although within Aristotle's Posterior Analytics little is said of
explanation through the identification of the efficient cause, in his
physical and biological treatises, Aristotle identifies a great number of links between efficient cause and effect which conform to
the transmission model. Just as the fire imparts it own heat to the
object sitting near it, so an animal is thought to transmit its own
species-form to its offspring. The series of regular natural events
is to be understood as a series of basic stuffs or beings in the
process ofbeing·transmitted from source to recipient. In each case,
given appropriate contact, a thing which is actually x must transmit
x to that which is only potentially x.9 God's activity too, was

8

See A. C. Lloyd, "The Principle that the Cause is Greater
than the Effect," Phronesis 21 (1976): 146-51 and A. P. D.
Mourelatos, " Aristotle's Rationalist Account of Qualitative
Interaction," Phronesis 29 (1984): 1-16.
9

Aristotle's conception of efficient causation is to be
understood along the lines of the transmission model. Formal
causati_on follows this model only insofar as one is explaining the
efficient cause for the form's inherence of matter ( although
perhaps the attribution of a formal cause to a state of affairs
understood synchronically would follow this model, insofar as the
form is understood as something different from the composite
substances whose .b asic attributes and abilities are inherited from
the form, imparting to them its structure and attributes). In the case
of final causation we can hardly have a case of a future, planned
event, transmit something back to the present Nonetheless the
purpose in the mind of the agent can be transmitted ~hrough action.
That is to say, that which the agent has in mind, first exists in the
mind, and thereby is imparted to that which has the potentiality for
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understood in this way, especially among the Greek neoplatonists
and the Arab Aristote)ians. 10 God is thought to be the cause of the
being of things by virtue of imparting the being that He has in
Himself. The analogy is often made to the sun, which iJluminates
all things by imparting its own light. 11

being its substrate. Similarly, the final cause of the developing
organism is found in the form ofthat organism which is transmitted
through the seed (Phys. 2.7 198a22-27, Meta. Z 7). The case of
material causation may be hardest to subsume under the
transmission mode). One can say, however, that pre-existent matter
is responsible for certain attributes of a composite substance since
it conveys some of its (lower-level) formal attributes to the composite of which is the substrate. (For example, the bottle is brittle
because it is made of glass, and glass is a brittle stuff.)
1

°This is also how Maimonides understands Aristotle's
account of God's activity. See .the discussion in Guide of the
Perplexed 2.12 of God's activity as an "overflow," a neoplatonic
notion absent from the writings of Aristotle, for whom God, as
object of desire, is responsible for the motion of things, not their
existence (Meta. 12.7). Maimonides accepts the neop)atonic
version of Aristotelian metaphysics put forward by the Arabic
Aristotelians, especially al-Farabi. See his praise of al-Farabi's

works as "faultlessly excellent" in the letter to Samuel Ibn Tibbon,
quoted in the S. Pines, "Translator's Introduction'' in Maimonides,
The Guide ofthe Perplexed (Chicago: University ofChicago Press,
1963).
11

See Plato, Republic 6 508b-509c, Plotinus, Enneads
5.3.12.39-44and 5.l.6.26-30(on which seeJ. Bussanich, The One
and Its Relation to Intellect in Plotinus: A Commentary on Selected
Texts [Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1988], pp. 134-35), from
which derives the pseudo-Aristotelian Theology ofAristotle 8, by
which the metaphor was conveyed to Arabic Aristotelians and to
Jewish philosophers, including Jewish mystical thought; cf. G.
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But it would seem as though causality as transmission is
incompatible with monism. Must not that which is imparted, and
that which receives it, be truly different from that which is doing
the imparting?
Perhaps multiplicity itself is that which is being imparted
to the world. But, in accordance with the Transmission Model, the
source of the multiplicity would already have multiplicity within
it. But this is incompatible with monotheism and, a fortiori, with
the monism which R. Schneur Zalman takes to be fundamental to
Judaism.
If, as Tanya 2 .1 declares, love of God is to rest on knowledge of God, the transmission model of causality, accepted as
furnishing a complete understanding of what it is to cause either
something to exist or an event to occur, would be dangerous to
Jewish life. But within the second book of Tanya an alternative
account of causation is put forward, to the end of rendering
partially intelligible God's activity upon and in the world.

***
In Chapter 2 of the second book of the Tanya, R. Schneur Zalman
addresses the objection of those who question the philosophical
possibility of the miracle by which the Red Sea was parted. The
heretics object that such an irruption in the natural course of events
is unacceptable to reason. In response, the R. Schneur Zalman
sugges~s that they are focusing on the sort of creation that occurs
when one created being ( such as an artisan) works on another (such
as an artifact). But God's activity involves bringing about the vel)'
being of a thing, a mode of causation both higher and more
fundamental than that involved in the miracle of the parting of the

Scholem, Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism (New York: Schocken
Books, 1946), p. 203. J. Schochet outlines Jewish antecedents for
the sun and light analogy in Mystical Concepts . in Chasidism
(Brooklyn: Kehot 1988), pp. 41-42 n. I2; reprinted as an appendix
to Likkutei Amarim- Tanya 887, n. 12.
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Red Sea. In the latter case, an existing substance was simply given
a new characteristic. R. Schneur Zalman calls it "[making] one
existing thing out of [another, already] existing thing (yesh miyes).
The greater miracle lies in the fact that a thing exists at all: the fact
that God has created a thing out of nothing (yesh me 'ayin)." 12 In
providing this answer to the heretic, R. Schneur Zalman makes
clear that the point he is making is not merely conceptual; it is
ethical. He asks the reader to consider the ethical consequences of
the heretic's objection. If indeed it were impossible for the Red
Seas to part, if indeed this would be beyond the capacity of God,
or would constitute a compromise in God's unity, Torah would be
a compilation of falsehoods, and there would be no obligation to
perform or keep from performing any action, simply on account of
the fact that it is commanded by Torah.
The model of causation that is presented to account for
yesh m 'ayin is the tzimtzum (alternatively translated as "contraction" or "concealment.")13 The basic idea, which R. Schneur
Zalman adopts from Lurianic kabbala, is that creation does not
involve adding anything to reality that was not already in the
source. For saying this imputes a deficiency to the source. If, in the
beginning, all there is is the source, and this source is lacking in
nothing, how could anything possibly be added to it? Yet creation
occurs. Since it is a causal activity, it would seem that creation
somehow involves transmission of what is in the source.
Transmission to what? To something new? But if there is something new, then in the process of creation something new has been
added to the source, and we have seen that, from the monistic
standpoint that R. Schneur Zalman adopts, this is impossible.
So how can creation be a process by which something new
comes about? Creation must be a kind of subtraction from the

12

See Tanya2.2, 289- 91, and the commentary of Wineberg
in Lessons in Tanya, vol. 3 (1991), pp. 843-47.
13

The following remarks are confined to the first tzimtzum,
the tzimtzum harishon, by which creation ex nihilo is effected.
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source. Nothing is present in the created that is not in the creator,
but there is much in the creator that is not in the created. Creation
is to be understood as a process by which God conceals and
restricts His own being. 14 Given the monistic assumptions that
underlie the account of creation, this concealment and restriction
cannot constitute a real withdrawal of God away from the world,
a point on which R. Schneur Zalman and his successors insisted,
in opposition to those who interpreted the Lurianic teaching as
asserting that God is not present within the phenomenal world. 15
The tzimtzum furnishes the conditions under which such an
appearance can arise. The withdrawal of God is. the means by
which there comes about the limited perspective by which reality
is perceived in a manner different from how it is perceived by God.
God' s causality, then, is jointly found in transmission and
withdrawal.
Although the true nature of the tzimtzum is wholly
impenetrable to human reason, 16 two metaphors shed some light is
shed on this. The first is that ofthe relation between the sun and its

14

See the introductory accounts of the tzimtzum in G.
Scholem, pp. 260-64; J. Schochet, Mystical Concepts in
Chasidism (Brooklyn: Kehot, 1988), pp. 47-57; Elior, pp. 79- 8 l;
Gurary, pp. 95-102; R. Oakes, "Creation as Theology: In Defense
of a Kabbalistic Approach to Evil," Faith and Philosophy 14
( 1997): 510--22.
15

See Tanya 2. 7, On the controversy, see Elior, pp. 80--91 ,
Gurary, pp. 102-16.
16

See, for example, Tanya 2.4, 299: "And it is not within
the scope of the intellect of any creature to comprehend the
essential nature ofthe tzimtzum and concealment [ofthe life-force]
and that nonetheless the body of the creature itself be created ex
nihilo--just as it is not within the capacity of _a ny creature's
intellect to comprehend the essential nature ofthe creation of being
out of nothing."
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light. We have noted that, among the Greeks, this served as a
prototypical example of a causal relationship of transmission.
Thus, according to Republic 6 the sun transmits both wannth, by
which physical things exist, as well as light, by which other
physical beings are aware of them (through sight). Likewise, the
Form of the Good transmits being to the Forms (which in tum are
responsible for whatever intelligible characteristics physical things
possess), and also imparts that which is required if they are to be
known. The Good performs this function by its own intelligibility
and being to the things for which it is responsible. 17
Neoplatonic thinkers found a new way to exploit Plato's
metaphorical description of the Form of the Good as a kind of sun.
The ultimate cause of all things, the Good or the One, causes the
Forms to be through a kind of flowing out, or imparting of what is
already within it. Like the outpouring of the sun' s radiance, this is
a kind of transmission of inner content that does not diminish that
which is present in the source, by which the source is never
exhausted. The model of emanation is likewise extended to other,
derivative causal processes. Divine causation is thus understood as
a kind of transmission of characteristics that God already possesses.
The metaphor of the sun shining on the created world
maintains a real distinction between cause and caused, the agent
and the recipient of the transmission. This is incompatible with the
monistic metaphysics of the Tanya. R. Schneur Zalman deals with
this issue by finding a third way to exploit the metaphorical likening of God to the sun.
According to the neoplatonic metaphor, the rays of the sun
represent Intellect, the second hypostasis, which is multiform and
different from the One, its source, which radiates as it remains

17

See G. Santas, "The Form of the Good in Plato's
Republic" in J. P. Anton, and A : Preus, eds., Essays in Ancient
Greek Philosophy, vol. 2 (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1983), pp. 232-63.
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unchanged. 18 As such it is an antecedent for R. Schneur Zalman' s
use of the metaphor. But R. Schneur Zalman alters the force of the
metaphor by taking it in a new direction. He considers the status of
the unity and independence of the sun' s rays, as regarded from the
vantage point of the sun itself. The sun is likened to God, that
which has the true perspective of the unity of all things, the sun's
rays to the things that God creates (which, from the outside, are
aware of a p]urality). When considered in relation to the sun itself,
the rays have no separate existence, they are simply an aspect of
the sun's activity, an aspect which, if properly understood, is not to
be distinguished from the central activity of the core. However,
from a perspective distanced from the sun, a perspective from
which one is blind to the inner workings ofthe sun's radiance, each
ray spreads itself out independently from the sun, and appears to
have an existence unto itself.
There in its own place, this radiance is considered
naught and complete nothingness, for it is absolutely nonexistent in relation to the body of the
sun-globe which is the source of this light and
radiance, inasmuch as this radiance and light is
merely the illumination which shines from the
body of the sun-globe itself. It is only in the space
of the universe, under the heavens and on the
earth, where the body of the sun-globe is not
present, that this light and radiance appears to the
eye to have actual existence . . . ln the same
manner the term YESH ("existence" can be
applied to all created things only [as they appear]
to our corporeal eyes, for we do not see nor
comprehend at all the source, which is the spirit of
G-d, that brings them into existence. 19

18

See the Plotinus references in n. 11.

19

Tanya 2.3, 293- 95.
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R. Schneur Zalman must accept a kind of idealism, in order to
grant some limited reality to the phenomenal world. In reality,
there is only God, but there are many appearances of many other
things. Creation is, in effect, the generation of a multiplicity of
perspectives. Only that perspective that comprehends the unity of
all things is true. Yet other perspectives exist. They themselves are
caused by a kind oftransmission: they exist by virtue ofthat which
possesses the true perspective. In this way, R. Schneur Zalman
suggests that one can understand how it can be the case that all
objects other than God depend on God for their very being, and yet
show themselves to us as having an independent existence of their
own. From the point of view of God there is only God; yet, from
our point of view, distant from God and His workings, the results
of the divine activity (including ourselves) seem to have the status
of independent beings.
We see that the Tanya employs a Transmission Model of
Causality, with a difference. It is not only the being ofthe attribute
itself that is being transmitted. Rather, what is being transmitted is
primarily consciousness, by virtue of which there is a unique
perspective by which there can be awareness of such an attribute.
For such consciousness is the precondition of the phenomenal
existence of attributes. But is not the generation of even a new
perspective the adding of something new, which was not present
in the divine source? R. Schneur Zalman denies this. The
generation of a new perspective is merely a subtraction, by virtue
of the tzimtzum. What is subtracted is the awareness of God as the
ultimate source and the ·ultimate reality. It is this that makes
possible a separate consciousness, able to see itself and other
objects as independent beings.20 The sun metaphor is intended to

20

"In reality, they [heaven and earth] are completely
nullified in relation to the 'Word of God' and the ' Breath of His
mouth,' may He be blessed, wh1ch are unified with His Essence
and Being, may He be blessed ... just as the light of the sun is
nullified in the sun. Yet these are his Restraining Powers, to hide
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provide some limited comprehension of how created beings are
mistakenly seen by themselves as separate, independent beings.
But al 1 of the rays of the sun are qualitatively alike. The
metaphor fails to account for how it can be the case that there is the
appearance of different things, from those perspectives that are
generated. We have already noted that such appearance could arise
only through the tzimtzum. Two things appear different only because that which they have in common is somehow suppressed or
canceled. But the metaphor of the sun and its rays, which lends
itself so well to the transmission model, and can be exploited to
illustrate how an effect can be substantially one with its cause, is
unsuited for illustrating this aspect of Creation, as R. Schneur
Zalman conceives it. For in the tzimtzum, the cause withholds itself from its effect. But what could be a negative transmission, or
a taking of the effect back into the cause? This cannot be illuminated by appealing to how things are with the sun, for the sun's
radiance does not involve subtraction or taking anything away.
There is need ofanother, complementary metaphor, which
illustrates how it is possible for something "new" to come to be, by
virtue of a withholding or constriction of the cause. Such a metaphor is provided by the Scriptural account of Creation. The Zahar
(I ISb) teaches that the divine utterances related at the beginning
of Genesis are the actions by which God creates the world. 21 R.
Schneur Zalman exploits this to develop the metaphor of creation
as speech, which complements the metaphor of creation as
radiance.
Even from a naive point of view, not attending to the
intricate cognitive processes that underlie communication, speech

and conceal, through the attribute of Gevurah [restraint] and
Tzimtzum, the life-force which flows into them, so that heaven and
earth and all their host should appear as if they were independently
existing entities" (Tanya 2.6, 305-7).
21

See The Zohar, tr. H. Sperling and M . Simon (London:
Soncino Press, 1933), pp. 68--69, cf. 381 .
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cannot be adequately understood within the framework of the
Transmission Model of Causality. To be sure, any sort of communication might be regarded as a transmission of meaning, from
one mind to another. But ( even if one were to grant the possibility
of the sort of communication that telepathy or prophecy might
involve) what is internal to the cause of the communication is far
different from what is expressed. To say something is to select
what is expressed from the practically unlimited number of things
that might be expressed. Other thought is held back. Contrast the
sun, as R. Schneur Zalman understands it. What is within the sun,
heat and light, is radiated. There is no kind or characteristic within
the sun that is held back, and that which is radiated is all of a kind.
Thus, R. Schneur Zalman understands the speech metaphor
as conveying the teaching that creation is a kind ofcommunication,
whereby only what is spoken is not concealed. But even as he
explains this point, he hastens to remind his readers of what the
sun metaphor makes clear, tha~ even following Creation, what is
created is not something different from what creates it:
However, " The nature of the D ivine order is not
like that of a creature of flesh and blood"
[Berachot 40a]. When a man utters a word, the
breath emitted in speaking is something that can
be sensed and perceived as a thing apart,
separated from its source, namely, the ten
faculties of the soul itself.22 But with the Holy
One, blessed be He, His speech is no~ Heaven
forfend, separated from His blessed Self, for there
is nothing outside of Him, and there is no place
devoid of Him. Therefore His blessed speech is
not like our speech, G-d forbid, Gust as His
thought is not like our thought ... His blessed
speech is called "speech" only by way of an

22

This is a reference to the ten sephirot, aspects of divine
activity which have their analogues in human psychology.
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anthropomorphic illustration, in the sense that, as
in the case of man below, whose speech reveals to
his audience what was hidden and concealed in
his thoughts, so, too, is it on high with the blessed
En Sof, 23 Whose emitted light and life-force-as
it emerges from Him, from concealment into
revelation- is called "speech." 24
Just as a sage can only express his wisdom by means of the
expression of words, which are vastly more limited that the things
that remain unsaid, so God expresses His being only by means of
the tzimtzum, understood along the model of speech.
Now, with terrestrial man, for example, when one
who is so great a sage as to comprehend the
wonders of wisdom contracts his intellect and
thought to a single letter of his speech, this is an
immense tzimtzum and a great descent for his
wondrous wisdom. Metaphorically speaking,
precisely so, and infinitely more so, there was an
immensely great and mighty tzimtzum when
during the six days ofcreation "The heavens were
made by the word of the Lord, and all their hosts
by the breath of their mouth."25

23

This refers to God as the infinite, prior to any revelation.

24

25

Tanya 1.21 , 87.

Tanya 4.5, 415. Here R. Schneur Zalman seems to have
. in mind the contraction of a conceptual account into the physical
fonn of articulate speech; in other works (Ma 'amre Admor haZaken 5562 [Brooklyn: Kehot, 1964], p. 35; Ma 'amre Admor haZaken 5568 [Brooklyn: Kehot, 1982], pp. 484, 548) he makes clear
that the expression of an abstruse concept in simple terms commensurate with the student's level of understanding is similarly an
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Only by virtue of such "speech" is the wisdom of the sage
articulated into discreet elements. Likewise, only through the
divine "speech" does there arise the phenomenal multiplicity, by
virtue of which each thing that appears to be an independent entity
manifests distinct characteristics. These characteristics are all
present in the source; as such the metaphysics of R. Schneur
Zalman follows the Transmission Model. But the tzimtzum,
especially as illustrated by the metaphor of voice, points to a
crucial respect in which effe.ct does not simply flow from the
source. The characteristics of things that are derived .from God
reveal themselves to us as limited, and they do not immediately
reveal to us their ultimate source within the divine unity. These
limitations do not themselves exist in the effect by virtue of being
transmitted by the source. Rather they exist because what has been
transmitted is itself Iimited.
The great virtue of the Transmission Model of Causality
is that it renders intelligible the relation between cause and effect.
A Humean theory of causation, on the other hand, denies that the
world presents such intelligible connections; for Hume there are
only regular sequences of like perceptions. Neither the
Transmission Model nor the Humean theory, however, serves to
illuminate the relationship between God as cause and Creation, as
required by a religious monism. The tzimtzum, as illustrated by the
dual metaphor of sun and voice, goes a long way to fill the gap.
I am gratefulfor the suggestions and advice offered by R
·Yoseph Samuels, R Zelig Rivkin, Irving Block, and Chad Meister
concerning earlier versions of this paper.
Marquette University

example of the contraction found in speech.

